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THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION
DESIGN
UDA Y DESAI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Implementation studies examine impediments to effective policy im-
plementation' and often identify why some policy legislation fails to be
carried out in the way lawmakers had intended.2 Two basic assump-
tions of such studies are that poicymakers pay insufficient attention to
the difficulties of implementation, and that policy design can benefit
from implementation research.3
* Mr. Desai is an associate professor in the political science department at
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale. He wishes to thank Mr. Steve Pollack for his
research assistance.
1. This Article does not provide a detailed summary and evaluation of implementa-
tion literature. Such literature offers no real prescriptions because its advice is "strategi-
cally vague." Elmore, Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy
Decisions, 94 POL. Sci. Q. 601 (1979-80). Nor has such literature produced policy rele-
vant knowledge. J. PRESSMAN & A. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION 176 (1979) (quot-
ing a letter by Alex Radian). The study of policy implementation is generally not useful
in helping to understand the policy process or in providing guidance on avoiding or
overcoming implementation problems. See generally Ingraham, Toward More System-
atic Consideration of Policy Design, 15 POL'Y STUD. J. 611 (1987); S. Linder & B. Pe-
ters, A Design Perspective on Policy Implementation: The Fallacies of Misplaced
Prescription (1985) (paper presented to the 1985 Annual Western Political Science As-
sociation, Las Vegas, Nevada).
2. D. MAZMANIAN & P. SABATIER, IMPLEMENTATION AND PUBLIC POLICY 5
(1983).
3. See generally Van Meter & Van Horn, The Policy Implementation Process, 6 AD-
MIN. & Soc'Y 445 (1975); E. BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME 36 (1977); R.
NAKAMURA & F. SMALLWOOD, THE POLITICS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 1
(1980); G. EDWARDS, IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC POLICY 5 (1980); D. MAZMANIAN,
supra note 2, at 3.
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Scholars have urged policymakers to rank and clearly and precisely
define their policy objectives.4 Such policy mandates should be "real-
istically" ambitious, clear in language, and specific in authorization so
as to facilitate policy implementation. In the United States political
system, however, ambiguity in policy mandates is not a matter of acci-
dent or oversight by policymakers. It is a method of enacting policy
legislation.5
Some scholars recommend explicit and coherent structuring of the
implementation process6 in addition to the clear and precise policy
mandates. Some scholars make a strong case for viewing implementa-
tion as an "evolution" 7 and for "matching, mixing, and switching" im-
plementation strategies in response to changes in policy situations and
the policy stage.' Those commentators generally assume that an ex-
plicit and well-articulated implementation design, as an integral part
of the statutory policy design itself, rather than as an afterthought,
would greatly aid the policy's implementation.9
Many independent variables significantly affect the policy implemen-
tation process. They include the characteristics of target groups, the
availability of financial and personnel resources, the tractability of the
problem, socioeconomic conditions, 0 communications, dispositions,
4. See Smith, The Policy Implementation Process, 4 POL'Y Sci. 197 (1973); Rein &
Rabinovitz, Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective, in AMERICAN POLITICS AND
PUBLIC POLICY (W. Burham & M. Weinberg eds. 1978); D. MAZMANIAN, supra note 2;
Myrtle, A Managerial View of Policy Implementation, 17 Am. REV. OF PUB. ADMIN. 17
(1984).
5. See C. LINDBLOOM, THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 28 (1968); C. LINDBLOOM,
THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 87 (1965).
6. See D. MAZMANIAN, supra note 2, at 25; D. MAZMANIAN & P. SABATIER, EF-
FECTIVE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION (1981).
7. Majone & Wildavsky, Implementation as Evolution, in IMPLEMENTATION 177 (3.
Pressman & A. Wildavksy eds. 1979).
8. Berman, Thinking About Programmed and Adaptive Implementation: Matching
Strategies to Situations, in WHY POLICIES SUCCEED OR FAIL 205 (H. Ingram & D.
Mann eds. 1980).
9. This Article makes a distinction between "policy design" and "implementation
design." Policy design primarily concerns the causal theory, ends-means hypotheses
connecting policy objectives with policy statutes. See D. MAZMANIAN, supra note 2, at
25-26; J. PRESSMAN & A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 1, at 147-62. Implementation design
concerns the details of execution and the extent and complexity of joint action. Id.
Defects in causal theory may cause policy failure. This is a failure of policy, not a
failure of implementation design. In practice, policy and implementation design are
usually interwoven in policy enactments. They are, however, conceptually distinct.
10. D. MAZMANIAN & P. SABATIER, supra note 2, at 24.
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the bureaucratic structure,1 presence of a "fixer,"' 1 2 and sound causal
theory.' 3
This Article argues that implementation design specified in policy
legislation is potentially a major source of conflict and difficulties in the
carrying out the legislative policy. Explicit and well-structured imple-
mentation design may sometimes help in the speedy and smooth imple-
mentation of policy, particularly under favorable conditions. Under
one of the following circumstances, however, the statutory implemen-
tation design is likely to become itself a major source of conflict and
difficulties: when policy legislation significantly and adversely affects
the economic interests of large and well-organized business or industry
group; when the policy becomes part of or engenders strong ideological
conflicts; and when there is deep distrust between conflicting interests
and groups. Regardless of the specificity of the implementation de-
sign, under these circumstances, the opposing ideologies and self-inter-
ests of important implementation actors engender conflict. These
warring actors reforge implementation design into a weapon they wield
to advance their interests and ideas. Interest and ideology seriously
limit what a well-structured implementation design, solid causal the-
ory, or clear policy mandates can do to smooth and speed policy
implementation.
This Article focuses on the importance of interests and ideologies in
policy implementation. The United States Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act (SMCRA) of 1977 is an illustration. As with most
social and political events, the conflicts and difficulties in the imple-
mentation of SMCRA are susceptible to widely varying interpreta-
tions. 4 The politics of statutory implementation design itself is an
11. G. EDWARDS, supra note 3, at 17, 89, 125.
12. A "fixer" tries to broker, arbitrate, cajole or otherwise try to "fix" matters so
that execution of the statute proceeds smoothly. See generally E. BARDACH, supra note
3, at 268-83. Bardach argues that a fixer, preferably a legislator, should be part of the
policy itself. Id. In the case of SMCRA, the House Subcommittee on Energy and Envi-
ronment came close to being a fixer because of its members' knowledge of the environ-
mental impact of surface mining, their commitment to the environment, and their
continuous, direct oversight of the Act's implementation. For a fixer to be effective,
however, certain conditions must exist, including having allies in the field; the subcom-
mittee had none. Sharp conflicts among powerful interests and deep ideological divi-
sions put strict limitations on the use of a fixer.
13. D. MAZMANIAN, supra note 2, at 25.
14. M. DERTHICK, NEW TOWNS IN-TOWN: WHY A FEDERAL PROGRAM FAILED
83 n.1 (1972).
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explanation that seems most illuminating and mostly neglected. 5
II. SMCRA: STATUTORY IMPLEMENTATION DESIGN
President Jimmy Carter signed SMCRA into law on August 3,
1977. The Act attempts to regulate the adverse environmental im-
pacts of surface coal mining through highly technical provisions that
address such concerns as blasting, acid runoff and sedimentation con-
trol, hydrological balance, restoration of original contour, and farm-
land productivity. The standards within the Act are clear and specific.
The Act, for example, requires specific premining chemical analysis of
overburden 16 and premining hydrological surveys. The Act expressly
prohibits contamination of surface and ground waters from acids.1
7
The Act created the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and En-
forcement (OSM) in the Department of the Interior to administer pro-
grams required by the Act and to assist development of state
programs.18 The Act calls for cooperation between the Secretary of the
Interior and the states in the regulation of surface coal mining. The
Act, recognizing that topology, hydrology and other factors that affect
surface mining and reclamation vary widely among the states, gives the
states primary responsibility for developing, issuing, and enforcing
15. It is possible, and arguably more appropriate, to interpret this case as a study in
federalism. The importance of federalism in understanding implementation is securely
established. See M. DERTHICK, supra note 13, at 83; Murphy, Title I of ERISA: The
Politics of Implementing Federal Education Reform, 41 HARV. EDuc. REV. 35 (1971).
Implementation design, as a source of implementation difficulties, has been largely ne-
glected. Students of regulatory politics have considered statutory implementation de-
sign as an issue in regulatory policy making, generally arguing that detailed statutory
implementation design results in lack of flexibility and leads to economic inefficiencies.
They have not generally addressed the "politics" of statutory implementation design.
See Marcus, Environmental Protection Agency, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 267
(J. Wilson ed. 1980).
16. Overburden is a technical term for topsoil and soil strata removed in strip min-
ing to reach a coal seam.
17. Surface Mining Control and Land Reclamation Act § 101, 30 U.S.C. § 1201
(1982). Additionally, the Act requires premining chemical analysis of overburden and
premining hydrological surveys; prohibits acid contamination of surface and ground-
water; specifies disposal sites, deadlines for burial and treatment of overburden and
plugging boreholes, shafts, wells, and auger holes; and restricts the disturbance, reloca-
tion, and diversion of streambeds, the allowable amounts of iron, manganese, and total
suspended solids in water leaving mine sites. Id.
18. SMCRA § 201(b), 30 U.S.C. § 1211(b) (1982). The Act requires the Senate to
confirm the OSM director, emphasizing legislative concern that OSM be autonomous of
the Department of the Interior and able rigorously to enforce the Act. Id.
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surface mining and land reclamation regulations.19 To ensure state ac-
tion meets federally mandated standards, the Act authorizes the Secre-
tary of Interior, acting through OSM, to review state programs to
determine if they effectively control surface mining operations and re-
claim abandoned lands.20 The OSM "assists" the states in developing
programs to "meet the requirement of the Act."2 1
The Act directed the Secretary to implement, within six months of
SMCRA's passage, a federal enforcement program that would be re-
placed by approved state programs or by a permanent federal pro-
22gram. Each state considered for primacy had to submit a program
for OSM review within eighteen months of enactment. The plan had
to show the state's capability to carry out the Act, and state sanctions
had to meet minimum requirements of SMCRA.23 OSM could order a
federal inspection of any site as a way to enforce the federal program
and to evaluate the administration of approved state programs. 2' A
state alleged to be inadequately enforcing the Act faces a public hear-
ing called by the Secretary. A state has a reasonable time to conform to
the Act before OSM can suspend or revoke the state program. 25
Legislators clearly expected the coal states to develop regulatory
programs in conformity with the Act and federal regulations. States
desiring primacy were required to submit their programs to OSM for
approval. Once approved, the states were expected to administer and
enforce their programs. Essentially, OSM was to guide states in devel-
oping regulatory programs that would form a collective national pro-
gram.26 OSM set national standards that were to be adapted, without
dilution, to varying regional conditions.
States were to be the primary regulatory authority, with OSM pro-
viding financial and technical help when necessary to bolster state reg-
ulatory and enforcement capabilities. A "state window" was to allow
states to adapt the Act and federal regulations to specific topology, hy-
drology, soil characteristics and other conditions in each state. OSM,
19. SMCRA § 101(f), 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (1982).
20. SMCRA § 201(c)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 1211(c)(1) (1982).
21. SMCRA § 201(c)(9), 30 U.S.C. § 1211(c)(9) (1982).
22. SMCRA § 502(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1252(e) (1982).
23. SMCRA § 503(a)(2), 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(2) (1982).
24. SMCRA § 517(a), 30 U.S.C. 1267(a) (1982).
25. SMCRA § 521(b), 30 U.S.C. 1271(b) (1982).
26. Menzel, Implementation of the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclama-
tion Act of 1977, 41 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 212 (1981).
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while leaving day-to-day inspection and enforcement to the state regu-
lators, was to ensure through inspections and other oversight activities
that the states were indeed enforcing the Act. OSM was also to receive
and act on citizen allegations of regulatory violations by mine opera-
tors or the state regulatory authority.
A timetable for putting the Act into place was strict and explicit.
Implementation was to proceed in three distinct but overlapping
stages: interim federal regulations, permanent federal regulations, and
state programs. Federal regulations were to be followed between the
Act's passage and the approval of state programs. Both OSM and state
TABLE 1
Statutory Actual
Publish Interim November 3, 1977 December 13, 1977
Regulation
Publish Permanent August 3, 1978 ,March 13, 1979
Regulation
Submit State Program February 3, 1979 March 3, 1980
Approve State Program June 3, 1980 January 3, 1981
or Implement Federal
Program
regulatory authorities were responsible for implementing the federal
regulatory program. Even after the approval of the state regulatory
program, OSM retained the authority to investigate the states' imple-
mentation of the Act, to revoke a state's primacy, and to regulate di-
rectly surface mining in states that fail to implement the Act
effectively. Table 1 illustrates the timetable specified in the Act and
SMCRA's actual off-schedule implementation that occurred.
27
In sum, the regulatory aims and implementation design were speci-
fied in great detail in the Act. Technical design standards, a strict
timetable for implementation, and procedural details of enforcement,
inspection, and oversight responsibilities of respective state and federal
regulatory agencies were all spelled out.
III. IMPLEMENTING SMCRA
The major conflict surrounding SMCRA shifted from the legislative
27. Table compiled by author from SMCRA legislative history.
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battle over its enactment to its implementation. While implementation
of SMCRA remains controversial and conflict-ridden even now, the
need for the federal legislation remains widely recognized. Even OSM
appointees under Ronald Reagan opposed legislative amendments to
SMCRA.28 The implementation design specified in SMCRA (the ap-
propriate roles of OSM and the states in the implementation of the
Act) has been the center of the SMCRA controversy.
While fortunes and strategies of key actors changed substantially
from the Carter administration to the Reagan years, SMCRA's imple-
mentation design remained a constant source of major conflict during
the two administrations.
A. The Carter Years
OSM received general support from key interest groups in the
months immediately following the Act's passage. Initially, the nation's
governors and the coal industry generally praised and supported
OSM's initial efforts.29 Key members of the House committee with
major oversight authority over OSM were supportive of the office and
its director, Walter Heine.3 °
Coal states' and the coal industry's support for OSM was short lived.
The coal states and coal industry officials became bitter and persistent
adversaries of OSM during the Carter years. As OSM moved to pro-
mulgate regulations and exercise its inspection and enforcement re-
sponsibilities, the coal states and coal industry became increasingly
opposed to OSM's implementation strategy.
Five months after the Act's passage, the coal states and the coal in-
dustry complained that OSM failed to meet the strict timetable set for
it by the Act, yet refused to extend deadlines set for the states and
industry. Coal state representatives argued that the timetable was un-
realistic or impossible.31 The coal industry was equally emphatic in
28. Implementation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977:
Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Energy and Mineral Resources of the Com-
mittee on Energy and Natural Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981) [hereinafter
1981 Senate Oversight Hearings].
29. Implementation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977.
Oversight Hearings, 1978: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Energy and the Environ-
ment of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 29
(1978).
30. Id. at 7, 67.
31. Id at 20-21, 50.
1989]
Washington University Open Scholarship
10 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 36:3
urging extension of the statutory implementation timetable. Coal in-
dustry associations and individual coal companies, including the Na-
tional Independent Coal Operators Association and the Mining and
Reclamation Council, urged extensions of six to twelve months.3 2 On
the other hand, OSM and environmentalists strongly objected to any
extension of the implementation timetable.33
Although OSM was seven months late in promulgating permanent
regulations that the states were to use in preparing their programs,
OSM initially refused to extend any deadlines for state program sub-
missions. After sustained complaints from the states, however, OSM
granted a six-month extension for program submissions. A federal
district court granted a further extension of seven months as a result of
state and industry lawsuits.34 The Solicitor General of the Department
of the Interior extended the deadline for OSM approval or rejection of
state programs. OSM's extension of deadlines came only after intense
pressure and criticism from the states and the industry. Instead of fa-
cilitating implementation, the very specificity of the implementation
timetable triggered the first of many political battles over implementa-
tion design.
The struggle over the timetable, however, was only an initial skir-
mish in the war over implementation of the Act. In addition to lobby-
ing Congress and going to the courts to delay the implementation of
the Act, the coal industry and several state governments mounted ma-
jor court challenges to the Act in dozens of lawsuits filed in early 1978.
Indiana, Illinois, and Virginia also filed lawsuits against OSM and its
implementation of the Act.
The constitutionality of the Act was challenged" as well as its scope
and manner of implementation.36 Coal industry associations charged
32. Id. at 26-27, 30.
33. Id at 5, 59.
34. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 653 F.2d 514, 527
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (en bane), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 822 (1981).
35. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assoc. v. Andrus, 604 F.2d 312, 314
(4th Cir. 1979) (challenge to enforcement of SMCRA under commerce clause and fifth
and tenth amendments); Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Ind. 1980) (coal
miners and operators challenged SMCRA provisions).
36. See In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 653 F.2d at 514-17
(challenging the Act's information requirements and criticizing numerous individual
regulations as beyond scope of Secretary of Interior's authority); Public Lands Inst. v.
Andrus, 497 F. Supp. 482 (D.D.C. 1980) (challenging Secretary of Interior regulation
amending 30 C.F.R. § 701.11 and § 741.11 which postponed operator compliance with
a permanent program for regulation of surface coal mining until approval of a state
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol36/iss1/2
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that OSM interim regulations exceeded the rulemaking powers granted
to OSM by the Act.37 Although constitutional challenges were unsuc-
cessful,3 8 challenges to OSM interpretation and implementation of the
Act succeeded in creating considerable confusion and delay.
The coal industry and the states insisted, often vociferously, that
OSM regulations went far beyond the Act and its congressional intent,
and that the Carter administration and its environmental allies were
trying to do through regulation what they could not do through legisla-
tion.39 The coal industry accused OSM of being overzealous in its im-
plementation of SMCRA. °
During the Carter years, the states charged that OSM promulgated
permanent regulations far more stringent than called for by the Act.
They accused OSM of defying congressional intent by attempting to
grab regulatory responsibility away from the states. The states further
charged that OSM was not utilizing the "state window" concept as
intended by Congress, but instead was requiring the states to accept
program or implementation of a federal program); Wilson Farms Coal Co. v. Andrus,
518 F. Supp. 295 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (challenging 30-day statute of limitations under the
Act for judicial review of Secretary of Interior's determination in adjudicatory proceed-
ings); Utah Int'l v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp. 962 (D. Utah 1979) (asking for declaratory
relief, seeking writ of mandamus requiring Secretary of Interior to execute and deliver a
preference right coal lease); see also D. Pearson, Public Policy and the Courts: An As-
sessment of the Failure in Implementing the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of
1977 (1982) (unpublished research report available at Southern Illinois University,
Carbondale).
37. In re Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 452 F. Supp. 327 (D.D.C. 1978).
38. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assoc., 452 U.S. 264
(198 1) (action by Association of Coal Producers engaged in surface coal mining opera-
tions in Virginia held constitutional in context of facial challenges); Hodel v. Indiana
452 U.S. 314 (1981) (certain general provisions of SMCRA held not violative of com-
merce cause, fifth amendment, and tenth amendment).
39. See Virginia Suit Against Strip-Mine Rules Nears End, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22,
1979, at A19, col. 1; Optimism on Strip-Mine Law, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1978, at 25-26;
Implementation of Public Law 95-87, The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
and Pending Legislation to Increase Authorization of Appropriations: Hearing Before
Subcomm. on Public Lands and Resources of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural
Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter Implementation of Public Law 95-
87] (addressing federal agency regulation under SMCRA).
40. REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, ISSUES
SURROUNDING THE SURFACE MINING CONTROL & RECLAMATION ACT 12 (1979)
[hereinafter COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT]; see generally Oversight on the Sur-
face Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 Oversight Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Energy and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter 1980 House Oversight Hearings] (testi-
mony of various state coal association and coal industry representatives).
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uniform standards.41
Despite these charges and court challenges, OSM strenuously de-
fended its implementation of the Act, characterizing the permanent
regulations as fair, workable, and protective of the environment. The
"state window" was included in the regulations. In order to use it,
however, OSM required states to show that their proposed regulations
were no less stringent than the Act and OSM permanent regulations,
and that the proposed alternatives were necessary. OSM argued that
uniform regulations were needed to establish minimum standards for
national regulation of surface coal mining; that it had allowed sufficient
time for state input in developing regulations; and that its design crite-
ria and standards were specific because the statutory standards set out
by Congress were specific. In short, OSM argued that it was following
the Act's legislative intent.42 Obviously, OSM's perspective on imple-
menting SMCRA was far different from that of the states. Two imple-
mentation actors could not have been further apart in the way they
looked at reality and assessed their positions.
Environmental groups during the Carter years supported OSM ef-
forts. The groups believed environmental protection was essential and
would best be guaranteed by activist OSM oversight of the states and
by uniform federal standards. Environmental groups argued that such
standards were not overly stringent because they allowed the "state
window."43 Congressional oversight hearings drew a large number of
environmental groups representing a wide variety of national and re-
gional concerns. They generally argued for strict enforcement of SM-
CRA and even accused OSM of not enforcing its interim performance
standards vigorously due to extreme political pressure from powerful
coal state governors.44
The success of the coal states in challenging and delaying OSM's
efforts had become a real concern to environmental groups. They lob-
41. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 40, at 13-14; see generally Im-
plementation of Public Law 95-87, supra note 39 (addressing problems and progress of
federal agencies in fulfilling their responsibilities under SMCRA); Implementation of the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: Oversight Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the House committee on Interior and Insu-
lar Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter 1979 House Oversight Hearings]
(addressing impact of SMCRA on coal business).
42. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 40, at 12; see Implementation
of Public Law 95-87, supra note 39; 1980 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 40.
43. COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 40, at 13-14.
44. 1979 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 41, at 58.
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bied for continued federal inspection to protect public lands, for cor-
rection of state misinterpretation of the grandfather clause, and for
OSM reassessment of state efforts to comply with the Act before grant-
ing primacy.4 5
In sum, Carter's OSM followed "enforced compliance" implemen-
tation strategy.46 Enforced compliance strategy is characterized by re-
liance on formal, precise, and specific rules; literal interpretation of
rules; a quest for uniformity; and the distrust of and an adversarial
orientation toward the regulated parties.4 7 OSM strategy was based on
the belief that the coal industry was unwilling to make a good faith
effort to comply with SMCRA and that the states were unlikely to rig-
orously enforce surface mining regulations. This strategy resulted in a
highly polarized and confrontational implementation process. The
coal industry and the states opposed OSM virulently and did all they
could to frustrate its implementation of the Act. They charged that
OSM regulations were "too inflexible, exceeded congressional intent,
were not cost effective, were influenced excessively by the agency's
'zealotry,'... and that the agency was bent on expanding its own pay-
roll and responsibilities to ensure survival."4 8 Environmental groups
and the Congress, particularly the Democratic majority in the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, generally supported OSM
implementation strategy and defended the agency against state and in-
dustry attacks.
Explicit implementation design, far from smoothing the path of pol-
icy implementation, was used by both sides to challenge their oppo-
nent's motives. Each tried to shape the implementation process to its
own advantage. The very implementation design became the
battleground.
B. The Reagan Years
With the election of Ronald Reagan, OSM implementation strategy
changed dramatically. OSM was one of the federal agencies singled
out as an example of regulatory excesses in a transition report by the
45. See generally 1979 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 41 (addressing SM-
CRA's impact on coal business).
46. N. SHOVER, D. CLELLAND & J. SYNXWILER, DEVELOPING A REGULATORY
BUREAUCRACY: THE OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING RECLAMATION AND ENFORCE-
MENT 78 (1983).
47. Id. at 29.
48. Id. at 55.
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conservative Heritage Foundation.49 The report accused OSM of
"zealotry" and promulgating regulations far in excess of the require-
ments of the Act. The report recommended that states be given a ma-
jor role in implementing the Act as soon as possible.5" The new
administration appointed people who had opposed the agency during
the Carter years to the top positions within OSM.
OSM strategy changed from OSM-led implementation under Carter
to state-led implementation under Reagan. This change was articu-
lated by Reagan's first OSM director, James Harris. "Under my direc-
tion, state primacy will be a central theme guiding the direction of the
OSM over the next four years.... This approach recognizes the basic
framework established under SMCRA."'
Regulatory reform at OSM involved three major changes. OSM
was reorganized to decentralize authority to state-level OSM offices
and to increase the states' power in regulating surface mining. It re-
placed regional OSM offices with state offices, field offices, and techni-
cal service centers. OSM increased the power of the national office
over state and field offices so that the national office could prevent state
regulatory excesses. The second change at OSM was a drastic reduc-
tion in the number of OSM employees, particularly inspection and en-
forcement personnel. These cuts were made to reduce OSM's role in
implementation and affected both national and field offices. The third
major change at OSM involved "regulatory relief." In mid-1981, OSM
targeted 89 rule sections for deletion, 329 sections for revision, and 112
sections for combination with other sections, while proposing 12 new
sections.52
The "state window" provision became more flexible through revi-
sion. The Carter OSM regulation requiring state regulation to be "no
less stringent than" the federal regulations was changed to read "no
less effective than." Performance standards replaced design standards
in the regulations. OSM increased the pace of approving state regula-
tory programs and thereby granted primacy in regulating surface min-
49. C. HEATHERLY, MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP 344-47 (1981).
50. Id.
51. Implementation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977:
Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1981) [hereinafter 1981
House Oversight Hearings].
52. Menzel, Redirecting the Implementation of a Law: The Reagan Administration
and Coal Surface Mining Regulation, 43 PuB, ADMIN. REv. 411 (1983).
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ing to the states. In the fall of 1981, there were two fully approved
state programs. By early 1983, nineteen state programs were fully ap-
proved." OSM enforcement style changed from one of confrontation
and distrust of the states and coal industry to one of cooperation and
gentle persuasion.
The states supported OSM's redirection to a more cooperative and
decentralized 'negotiated compliance' strategy.5 4 The Interstate Min-
ing Compact Commission, representing governors of sixteen major coal
producing states, expressed its full support for the changes made by the
Reagan OSM.55 A state regulator reaffirmed this support a year
later.5 6
The coal industry generally supported OSM efforts to shift imple-
mentation strategy. The coal industry's two major concerns - assur-
ing rapid approval of state programs and eliminating specific design
criteria - were fully addressed by the Reagan OSM, generally to the
industry's satisfaction. If anything, the industry, particularly small op-
erators, argued for further severe reduction in regulatory standards.5 7
Environmental groups became the major adversary of the Reagan
OSM's implementation of the Act. Environmentalists worried that the
Reagan OSM tried to gut SMCRA by emasculating OSM and by lax
and ineffective implementation. Environmentalists were forced into a
defensive posture, shifting their efforts from advocating a strong federal
presence and strict state and industry compliance during the Carter
years to merely defending the regulations during the Reagan years.5 8
The environmentalist - rather than the coal industry or states - in-
creasingly resorted to the courts to challenge OSM action and
53. Implementation of the Surface Mining Control & Reclamation Act of 1977
Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-14 (1983) [hereinafter
1983 House Oversight Hearings].
54. See N. SHOVER, D. CLELLAND & J. LYNXWILER, supra note 46, at 62.
55. Reorganization of the Office of Surface Mining: Oversight Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 72-73 (1981).
56. See generally Implementation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of
the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (concern-
ing strip mining reclamation).
57. See generally 1983 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 53 (discussing struc-
ture of state programs).
58. Id. at 37-43; see also 1981 Oversight Hearings, supra note 51, at 54-66.
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inaction.59
Congressional oversight of OSM implementation strategy, particu-
larly by members of the House of Representatives, has been intense
since SMCRA's passage in 1977.' 0 During the Carter years, the House
Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, particularly its Demo-
cratic members, generally supported OSM and its implementation
strategy in the face of intense state and industry criticism. On the
other hand, the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
tended to be critical of OSM. These roles were reversed during the
Reagan years. Democrats in the House subcommittee vigorously
questioned and prodded OSM officials, while Republican members
generally were silent. In the Senate, Republicans generally praised
OSM at oversight hearings.61 Democrats' participation in Senate hear-
ings was negligible. Democrats on the House subcommittee feared that
their efforts to enact and implement the Act were being undone by the
Reagan OSM.62
In brief, the Reagan OSM abandoned the strict oversight role of its
predecessor and instead worked closely with the states and coal indus-
try for state primacy and a wide-open "state window." OSM was re-
luctant to oversee the states to ensure implementation of the Act. It
was generally unwilling to enforce the law even when the states had
engaged in at best questionable practices.63 The Reagan OSM at-
tempted to change the extent of control over surface mining and its
environmental damage by adopting an implementation strategy dia-
metrically opposed to that of the Carter administration. The Reagan
administration and its supporters in Congress pointedly refused to
59. Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Clark, 725 F.2d 1434 (D.D.C. 1984)
(two citizen environmental groups); Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Watt,
550 F. Supp. 979 (D.D.C. 1982) (two Appalachian-based nonprofit environmentalist
organizations).
60. Congressional hearings on the implementation of SMCRA are relatively fre-
quent and usually occur in both Houses. See supra notes 28, 29, 40, 41, 51, 53, 55, 56
and infra note 61 for specific oversight hearing references.
61. See generally Implementation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act of 1977 in the Appalachian Coal Region: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy
and Mineral Resources of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (examining OSM implementation of SMCRA regulatory pro-
grains in the Appalachian region).
62. See generally 1981 House Oversight Hearings, supra note 51 (discussing whether
the Reagan OSM reclamation program was consistent with SMCRA).
63. See N. SHOVER, D. CLELLAND, & J. LYNXWILER, supra note 46, at 63-64.
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amend the Act" and instead relied on drastically changed implementa-
tion strategy to accomplish antiregulatory aims. The states and the
coal industry supported OSM in congressional hearings; environmental
groups and Democratic congressional supporters of the OSM in the
Carter years increasingly became the strongest critics of OSM's imple-
mentation during the Reagan years.
IV. CONCLUSION
Implementation of SMCRA continues to be a complex and bitter
episode in environmental politics. Bitter, protracted struggles between
environmental interests and the coal industry characterized SMCRA's
legislative history. The coal industry fought until the end to try to
defeat SMCRA.6 5 Environmental groups and congressional supporters
of the Act became convinced that the coal industry and the states could
not be trusted to protect the land from abuses by surface coal mining.
The Act's passage did not resolve the conflicts regarding surface coal
mining but merely transferred the conflicts from the legislative arena to
the implementation arena. Although legislative oversight authority re-
mained important and the House Interior and Insular Affairs Commit-
tee remained a major actor, OSM and the states became the central
players in the Act's implementation.
The politics of implementation centered on the implementation de-
sign itself as conflicts and contentions focused on how the Act should
be carried out. The coal industry concentrated on the implementation
phase to delay and minimize federal regulatory efforts. The coal in-
dustry had always preferred state regulatory programs to a federal
program. The implementation design specified in the Act required a
joint federal-state regulatory mechanism. The coal industry used this
provision to argue that the states must have the primary regulatory
authority and full flexibility to write their own regulatory programs
with a minimum of federal interference. The states generally agreed
with that contention.
Environmentalists, on the other hand, deeply doubted whether the
coal industry sincerely favored controls on environmental damage
caused by surface mining and were suspicious of the states' willingness
to regulate the coal industry. They interpreted the implementation de-
64. 1981 Senate Oversight Hearings, supra note 28, at 2.
65. R. VIETOR, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS AND THE COAL COALITION 85 (1981);
Wagner, Congress Clears Strip Mining Control Bill, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., July 23,
1977, at 1495-1500.
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sign specified in the Act as requiring a strong and continuing federal
role in setting regulatory standards and in enforcing those standards
through inspections and sanctions. They saw the Act's design as set-
ting up a nationally consistent regulatory program with the states do-
ing the day-to-day enforcement under the watchful eye of OSM. The
agency's own interpretation of the Act's design changed dramatically
from the Carter years to the Reagan years, reflecting the ideological
commitments of the two administrations.
It is clear that intense, protracted conflicts erupted over SMCRA's
implementatioi design, even though the Act's regulatory aims and im-
plementation methods were specified in great detail. The SMCRA ex-
perience seriously challengess the doctrine that clear mandates and
well-articulated statutory implementation design assure smooth imple-
mentation of policy. Studies in other regulatory policy areas support
that skepticism.66
Well-articulated implementation design may facilitate implementa-
tion under otherwise highly favorable circumstances - such as a lack
of conflicting interests and ideology, general agreement among con-
tending factions as to the appropriate legislative remedy and the mech-
anism for achieving it, and the absence of an intergovernmental agency
network for policy implementation. Such favorable conditions are ex-
ceptions, however, rather than the general rule. When powerful inter-
ests who deeply distrust one another contend for significant stakes,
clearly articulated statutory implementation design itself may become
merely an additional obstacle.
A clear-cut implementation design, even when detailed in the policy
legislation, is unlikely to make implementation smoother when a fun-
damental conflict of interests remains. The implementation design
quite likely will become another weapon in the battle between the inter-
ests involved. The coal industry's concern with adverse economic im-
pact, the state's interest in autonomy and its respective economy, and
the environmentalists' concern for the well-being of the planet create
severe conflicts that are not likely to be settled by a policy enactment.
Such conflicts invariably reappear in the implementation phase of a
66. See generally K. MEIER, REGULATION: POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY AND Eco-
NOMICS 18 (1985) (discussing the myths of regulation in various areas including con-
sumer protection, agriculture, and environmental protection); Kleman, Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 236 (1980);
Schultz & Wei, Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System, 80 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
1249, 1264 (1986).
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policy. The politics of implementation will remain despite explicit im-
plementation design or clear, specific policy mandates. Further empiri-
cal studies must identify the conditions under which clear and specific
statutory implementation design aids policy implementation.
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